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8 Wing, CFB Trenton get new CO

Lieutenant Colonel D.B. (Dave) Cochrane, CD, will take command of CFB Trenton and host unit 8 Wing on February 19th, 2010, following his promotion to full colonel.  Col. Cochrane was previously commanding officer of 426 Transport Training Squadron from 2006 through 2009; this unit prepares aircrews to fly the CC-130 Hercules tactical airlifter.

Col. Cochrane takes over from LCol. David Murphy (8 Wing Operations Officer), who was designated acting CO last Tuesday following the arrest of Col. Russell Williams.

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MTJA airfield flow and relief operations


Here’s a brief update to my prior post on the Jacmel aerodrome, as I have become aware of additional information. There are a number of good articles from multiple sources, each providing lots of good information. (Specifically a January 30th article in the Winnipeg Free Press; a January 29th article from Agence France-Presse; a January 19th article in the Globe & Mail; and an undated DND press release.)

I will collate and summarise the data points below to make it easier to comprehend, so that one does not have to flip between the various sources to get the big picture.

  • The strat-lifters (CC-150, CC-177) typically operate between CFB Trenton (CYTR) and Norman Manley Intl Airport (MKJP) in Kingston, Jamaica. The tac-lifters (CC-130) then take the cargo from Kingston to Jacmel. (See map below for more details.)
  • The CF installed airfield lighting at Jacmel in order to permit 24-hour flight operations; a fueling station has also been set up.
  • HMCS Halifax remains on station in Baie de Jacmel, providing radar coverage for air traffic separation.
  • CFB Trenton is burning through 500,000 litres of fuel a day. Keep in mind, though, that this is for all of CFB Trenton’s flight operations (training, flights to Afghanistan, etc), not just those relating to Haiti.
  • MGen Yvan Blondin elected to have Canadian Forces aircraft utilise Jacmel; USAF had previously surveyed the field and decided that its 3,300ft asphalt runway was too soft to handle the stress of high optempo, and too short to provide adequate margin of error for tactical airlifters.
  • CF engineers determined that the runway could sustain regular CC-130 operations, so long as the aircraft’s total weight (aircraft, fuel and payload) does not exceed 100,000 lbs / 45,359 kg.
  • The minimum landing distance for a CC-130H with a 100,000lb payload is approximately 3100 feet (1000 foot touchdown zone, 2100 foot rollout distance). This gives pilots a 200 foot margin of error.
  • The aerodrome has handled up to 64 aircraft movements in a single day.  This breaks down as 2.67 movements every hour, or one every 23 minutes.
  • The runway is already pitting and suffering damage from the optempo surge. High optempo is likely to last for 60 days and slacken thereafter.

Here’s an image I created using data from the Great Circle Mapper, showing approximate transit times for CF flights.

And another pre-earthquake image of Jacmel’s tiny terminal and apron.

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Canadian Forces CC-130 landing at MTJA Jacmel Airport

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Night mission

At Charleston Air Force Base, S.C., 1st Lt. David Redwine boards a C-17 Globemaster III before launching an air delivery mission in support of Operation Unified Response Jan. 20, 2010. Lieutenant Redwing is a pilot assigned to the 15th Airlift Squadron at Charleston AFB. (U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Jacob N. Bailey)

Capts. Ryan Nofziger and Aaron Kottlowski takeoff for a humanitarian aid mission to Haiti in a C-17 Globemaster III Jan. 20, 2010, from Pope Air Force Base, N.C. Pope AFB is participating in the relief effort to save lives and alleviate human suffering in the aftermath of the earthquake. (U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Jason Robertson)

Airman 1st Class Ryan Merriman provides security for a C-17 Globemaster III aircraft and its crew as earthquake relief supplies are unloaded at the airport in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Jan. 16, 2010. Airman Merriman is a member of a 437th Security Forces fly-away security team. (U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Jason Robertson)

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Airdrop north of Port-au-Prince

Some images excerpted from a photo essay on AF.mil, covering the January 18th airdrop of food and water to a drop zone five miles north of Haiti’s capital city.

Air Force combat controllers exit a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter to set up for an air delivery of humanitarian aid into Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Jan 18, 2010. The combat controllers are assigned to the 23rd Special Tactics Squadron at Hurlburt Field Fla. (U.S. Air Force photo/Tech. Sgt. James L. Harper Jr.)

Air Force combat controllers talk to passing Haitians prior to humanitarian aid being air dropped into Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Jan 18, 2010. The combat controllers are assigned to the 23rd Special Tactics Squadron at Hurlburt Field Fla. (U.S. Air Force photo/Tech. Sgt. James L. Harper Jr.)

A C-17 Globemaster III delivers humanitarian aid into the outskirts of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Jan 18, 2010. Department of Defense assets have been deployed to assist in the Haiti relief effort following a magnitude 7 earthquake that hit the city on Jan. 12, 2010. (U.S. Air Force photo/Tech. Sgt. James L. Harper Jr.)

A U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III airdrops humanitarian aid into the outskirts of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Jan 18, 2010. (U.S. Air Force photo/Tech. Sgt. James L. Harper Jr.)

An Air Force combat controller watches pallets after an air delivery of humanitarian aid Jan 18, 2010, in Port-au-Prince, Haiti for distribution. The combat controller is assigned to the 23rd Special Tactics Squadron at Hurlburt Field Fla. (U.S. Air Force photo/Tech. Sgt. James L. Harper Jr.)

An Air Force combat controller packs up equipment after an air delivery of humanitarian aid in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Jan 18, 2010. The combat controller is assigned to the 23rd Special Tactics Squadron at Hurlburt Field Fla. (U.S. Air Force photo/Tech. Sgt. James L. Harper Jr.)

An Air Force combat controller packs up equipment Jan 18, 2010 after an air delivery of humanitarian aid in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The combat controller is assigned to the 23rd Special Tactics Squadron at Hurlburt Field Fla. (U.S. Air Force photo/Tech. Sgt. James L. Harper Jr.)

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817 CRG deploys to Haiti

The 817th Contingency Response Group is a USAF unit that can rapidly deploy personnel to quickly open airfields in remote locations.  It is focused on conducting three main missions:

  1. Initial Airbase Opening (IAO)
  2. Joint Task Force—Port Opening (JTF-PO), where USAF and US Army units create logistics and distribution chains
  3. Expeditionary Air Mobility Support (EAMS) where CRG personnel augment or relieve existing mission forces

On January 14th and 15th, these were very busy folks.  A fuller account of their work lies here, courtesy of Joint Base Charleston’s PA folks.  I have included a small sample of six images from the accompanying photo essay.

Tech. Sgt. Robert Mabry, a reservist Loadmaster with the 317th Airlift Squadron, 315th Airlift Wing, Charleston AFB, conducts pre-flight duties on the Charleston AFB flightline, en route to support relief efforts to Haiti Jan. 14 in the aftermath of a devastating earthquake. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Joshua L. DeMotts)

Team Charleston members prepare to depart to McGuire Air Force Base, N.J., Jan. 14 to pick up humanitarian supplies to deliver to Haiti following the devastating 7.0 –magnitude earthquake that hit Tuesday morning. (U.S. Air Force photo/ Airman 1st Class Lauren Main)

Tech. Sgt. Robert Mabry, a reservist with the 317th Airlift Squadron, pushes cargo with help from Airmen from the 305th Aerial Port Squadron, Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, N.J., as they load cargo onto a Charleston AFB C-17, supporting a swift and coordinated relief effort to Haiti Jan. 14 in the aftermath of a devastating earthquake. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Joshua L. DeMotts)

Airmen with the 621st Contingency Response Wing, Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, N.J., catch a ride on a Charleston AFB C-17 just past midnight Jan. 15 en route to Port-au-Prince, Haiti, in support of the relief efforts going on there after a devastating earthquake. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Joshua L. DeMotts)

Airmen from the 621st Contingency Response Wing, Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, N.J., off load cargo from a Charleston AFB C-17 in the early morning Jan. 15 in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, in support of relief efforts in the aftermath of a devastating earthquake. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Joshua L. DeMotts)

Tents on the edge of the flightline in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, provide shelter to personnel participating in the relief effort in Haiti after a devastating earthquake Jan. 15.

As you look at that last photo, it is worth remembering that the tarmac where those tents are pitched was also conducting 24-hour flight operations.  Not easy to get any rest with turbines screaming in your ear all night.

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The intersection of “can do” and “risk averse”

Writing at the US Naval Institute’s blog, UltimaRatioReg examines what happens when the military’s traditional “can do” attitude is combined with greater institutional risk aversion.

And here is where the two seemingly opposite characteristics meet.  The danger of the “can do” attitude I alluded to above is that, of course, there will come a time when “can do” will cease to be a response to even a cursory examination of capabilities.  The commander or unit cannot do.  Has no chance to do.  The commander simply lacks the very minimum of resources to accomplish the mission.  Yet, the likelihood of honestly saying so is usually low.  Failure will be the result, which in the profession of arms is counted in terms of dead and wounded.   The importance of a command climate where commanders can talk to seniors honestly and willingly in such matters without fear of retribution cannot be overstated.  The mission still may be assigned, but the risks become known, might possibly be mitigated, and the chances for success improved substantially.

– UltimaRatioReg.  “Admiral Harvey’s Question, Writ Large.”  US Naval Institute blog, 11 January 2010.

If this scenario seems familiar to Canadian readers, it is because this was the state of the Canadian Forces in the past few decades, as recently retired General Rick Hillier highlights in the early portions of his book.  Imagine a world wherein Canada commits several thousand troops to a dangerous combat mission, while simultaneously slashing its defence spending by twenty-six percent.  Imagine over a dozen Canadians become combat fatalities and over a hundred are wounded, but they are repatriated back to their homeland with no fanfare, and little ongoing care and support.  Some are simply cashiered out of the force rapidly because their wounds render them useless in their former occupational specialties.  That sort of treatment would not speak well for this nation’s polity, would it?

Well, surprise surprise, you already lived through it in the 1990s.  Around sixteen Canadians died in combat operations in the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean, but you didn’t hear much about them back home.  The Canadian Forces did have its funding slashed repeatedly in successive federal budgets, while its overseas combat commitments increased.  The CF was forced, in fact, to send armoured training vehicles overseas—the Cougar, Grizzly and Husky variants of the AVGP, which were never intended to see combat—because it had few resources to send anything else.  Canadian troops were specifically targeted with direct-fire anti-armour weapons (RPGs and the like) by the enemy, but were portrayed in the media as being lost to mortars and indiscriminate area weapons.  And once home, wounded veterans did not get the best mental and physical rehabilitation available, because there simply wasn’t enough money for them.

Canada’s public was disinterested, and so they were disinclined to hold Canadian politicians accountable for their near-treasonous destruction of combat capability at the same time those politicians dramatically increased the CF’s combat commitments.

It took a long time for the Canadian Forces, the national defence civil bureaucracy and Canadian policymakers to shake off their risk-averse institutional cultures.  (And as a result, I remain skeptical of how long-lived this recovery of institutional spine will last.)  That decade was bad enough for Canada, which has chronically neglected serious consideration of its military priorities and capabilities ever since the formation of the Dominion.  It would be an even greater tragedy for the Western world’s security guarantor, the United States, to undergo something similar.

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Hillier on the future of NATO

NATO had yet to articulate a clear strategy for what it was doing in Afghanistan.  It failed to operate as one cohesive block in dealing with Pakistan, greatly diminishing its ability to affect what happens in that country—which, by the way, affects everything in Afghanistan.  In short, Afghanistan has revealed that NATO has reached the stage where it is a corpse, decomposing, and somebody’s going to have to perform a Frankenstein-like life-giving act by breathing some lifesaving air through those rotten lips into those putrescent lungs, or the alliance will be done. Any major setback in Afghanistan will see it off to the cleaners, and unless the alliance can snatch victory out of feeble efforts, it’s not going to be long in existence in its present form.  As Dr. Barney Rubin, an internationally renowned expert on Afghanistan, said, “NATO is condemned to success in Afghanistan.  Anything else will be the end of the alliance.

– Hillier, Rick [General, CF]. A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War.  Toronto:  HarperCollins Canada, 2009. p. 477. [Emphasis mine]

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The Future was 20 Years Ago

Majors Beth Jones (left) and Kevin Parrish, pilots with the 7th Expeditionary Air Combat and Control Squadron Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) crew members, prepare to take-off on a mission over Iraq on Sept. 1. This flight marks the 116th Air Control Wing’s Joint STARS 40,000 combat hours supporting the Global War on Terror. (U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Aaron Allmon II)

Dilbert author Scott Adams ponders how future iterations of unmanned aerial systems will make COIN warfare more dangerous for the insurgents.

I think the next big leap in drone technology will be artificial intelligence for locating targets. Humans would still have to make firing decisions, but I can imagine drones finding suspicious patterns of movement on their own and alerting humans. For example, any vehicle that stops at night on a road used by U.S. ground forces might be suspected of planting an IED. A human could decide if the suspect was up to no good.

There are probably a number of movement patterns followed by insurgents and terrorists. Maybe drones could learn to detect children in any outdoor group, based on their relative size, and assume such a group is not looking for a fight. Perhaps combatants follow routes less travelled by enemy ground forces, or travel only at night, or have more metal objects with them. The point is that drones will someday do a good job of identifying suspected bad guys automatically.

– Adams, Scott.  “Drone War.” Dilbert.com / Scott Adams Blog, 17 December 2009.

It’s not uncommon for tech-loving geeks to get hung up on the hardware or software, assuming that is what will drive the innovation.  What Mr. Adams does not realise is that the technology he is describing exists today—and has existed for about twenty years—albeit not aboard an unmanned platform.

The capability was designed back in 1985, to track the movement of Warsaw Pact armour and troop formations in the event of an invasion.  It is known as Ground Target Motion Indicator (GTMI), and it flies aboard the E-8 Joint STARS.  A single E-8 can monitor up to 600 targets at ranges up to 250 kilometres; Predators and Reapers must be much, much closer than that, and can only track a fraction as many targets simultaneously.

Two prototype E-8s earned high marks from AFCENT during the 1991 Gulf War.  In that conflict they were used to detect and track Scud launchers, convoys, vehicle marshalling areas, routes of retreat and so on.  They also contributed in a similar capacity for NATO missions in the Balkans, including 1999’s Operation Allied Force.

In 2003’s Operation Iraqi Freedom, the E-8s were initially typecast as an armoured unit tracker once again, but they have since developed new roles in our ongoing COIN conflicts.

Typical data includes distance and heading, plus a depiction of the size of a column. Analysts on the aircraft can also give a strong characterization of what they believe the vehicles may be. It’s not positive identification, but over time, analysts grow skilled in judging whether a trail of dots are people or different types of vehicles

…Buried in the billions of pixels of data are complete information sets on movement in the battlespace. With its unique wide area coverage, the Joint STARS radar archives weeks of enemy activity.

Jewels of data jump out from the wide area scans. Properly refined, the data creates a revealing picture of enemy movement around known locations and uncovers new sites through monitoring unexpected volume of traffic. Dots that pop up out of nowhere can tip off analysts to new insurgent routes, tactics, and hideouts. It is battlespace preparation—in reverse.

Pattern analysis was first used like crime-scene forensics. Analysts can call up old moving target indicator data and focus on the site of an improvised explosive device attack or the compound of a suspected terrorist. If analysts know where to look, Joint STARS can fill them in on the patterns of movement over the time preceding an attack. By comparing tracks day after day, enemy routines come into focus.

Joint STARS coverage is so wide that as long as the aircraft’s orbit was in the right country, the old logs would reveal practically all the movement to and from a site.

– Grant, Rebecca.  “JSTARS Wars.”  Air Force magazine, November 2009.

Two years ago, the Air Force started reviewing and analysing the JSTARS tapes nightly, to aid ground forces in planning their operations the following day.  That effort has paid dividends and continues today.

Next up are refinements to the radar and software which will—eventually—permit JSTARS sensors to reliably resolve individuals and waterborne targets.

Recent tests conducted on dismounted targets—people—suggest that Joint STARS moving target indicator may be reaching a new level of refinement. It may be possible in the future to characterize the moving target indicator “dots” as sheep, people, cars, trucks, or other types of targets. With upgrades, “I think they can get it down to actually being able to track a relatively heavily laden human,” said Grabowski.

– Grant, Rebecca.  “JSTARS Wars.”  Air Force magazine, November 2009.

1st Lt. Nathan Sukolsky, 7th Expeditionary Air Combat and Control Squadron Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) air weapons officer, tracks suspected movements on radar during a mission over Iraq on Sept. 1. (U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Aaron Allmon II)

UPDATE: This is one of the modern C4ISR systems that are indispensable to modern warfighters, but tend not to be reflected in Hollywood’s depictions of contemporary or future warfare.  I am betting that no wide area GMTI makes an appearance in Avatar, for example.

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Ooops

A MQ-1B Predator from the 361st Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron takes off in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, July 9, 2008. (U.S. Air Force photo/Tech. Sgt. Sabrina Johnson)

A MQ-1B Predator from the 361st Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron takes off in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, July 9, 2008. (U.S. Air Force photo/Tech. Sgt. Sabrina Johnson)

The Wall Street Journal has reported that our medieval enemies in Southwest Asia are able to grab live video feeds from unmanned aerial systems operating over Southwest Asia, using a cheap and readily available software package.

“Militants in Iraq have used $26 off-the-shelf software to intercept live video feeds from U.S. Predator drones, potentially providing them with information they need to evade or monitor U.S. military operations.

Senior defense and intelligence officials said Iranian-backed insurgents intercepted the video feeds by taking advantage of an unprotected communications link in some of the remotely flown planes’ systems. Shiite fighters in Iraq used software programs such as SkyGrabber — available for as little as $25.95 on the Internet — to regularly capture drone video feeds, according to a person familiar with reports on the matter.

…Last December, U.S. military personnel in Iraq discovered copies of Predator drone feeds on a laptop belonging to a Shiite militant, according to a person familiar with reports on the matter. “There was evidence this was not a one-time deal,” this person said. The U.S. accuses Iran of providing weapons, money and training to Shiite fighters in Iraq, a charge that Tehran has long denied.

…The difficulty, officials said, is that adding encryption to a network that is more than a decade old involves more than placing a new piece of equipment on individual drones. Instead, many components of the network linking the drones to their operators in the U.S., Afghanistan or Pakistan have to be upgraded to handle the changes.

– Gorman, Siobhan, Yochi J. Dreazen and August Cole.  “Insurgents Hack U.S. Drones.” Wall Street Journal, 18 December 2009.

If you are wondering how in the world this is possible, it is because the MQ-1 Predators and MQ-9 Reapers use unencrypted civil, not military, SATCOM links.  Earlier this year, when SecDef Gates and his acquisition czar John Young were busy putting the boots to the AF for failing to have 31 UAS CAPs over Iraq and Afghanistan, they were also busy killing funding for next-generation SATCOM upgrades, such as the Transformational Satellite (TSAT).

You see, USAF does not have the SATCOM bandwidth to host the UAS feeds in-house, and it won’t until it has a full WGS (Wideband Global SATCOM) constellation on orbit.

The Predator and Reaper rely on commercial, unencrypted links, which could potentially be intercepted by someone. Much of the UAS control is also done on Ku frequency bands, a frequency intended for satellite control, not air-to-ground communications. As a result, UAS control is a low priority—and the Air Force risks not having assured access.

To overcome these problems, the Air Force recognizes that the future Wideband Global SATCOM satellite or similar technologies can provide the secure communication links. In addition, the service is looking at potential surrogate satellite networks using high-altitude aircraft, such as lighter-than-air vehicles, to provide a data link network node.

– Isherwood, Michael W.  “Roadmap for Robotics.” Air Force magazine, December 2009, p. 34.

The question I asked (back in April 2009) was “will it still make sense to flood the sky with an ever-increasing number of UCAVs if your ability to see their output is constrained by your network?”  Well, we now know that DoD’s solution to the constrained milcom network was to use civil assets instead.  And as we are finding out now, there is a cost to that.

(Hat tip to Neptunus Lex for spotting the story.)

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