See the entire 6-image photo essay at AF.mil.
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Operation Christmas Drop’s sole purpose is to aid our fellow islanders by coordinating volunteer efforts from both military and civilian agencies and distrubute donations received from all corners of the world. It all started in 1952 when the aircrew of a WB-29 aircraft assigned to the 54th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, formerly assigned to Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, was flying a mission to the south of Guam over the Micronesian atoll of Kapingamarangi. When they saw the islanders waving to them, the crew quickly gathered some items they had on the plane, placed them in a container with a parachute attached and dropped the cargo as they circled again.
I never cease to be amazed by the generosity and compassion of our men and women in uniform. Regrettably I learned of Operation Christmas Drop too late to be of any practical assistance, but it’s worth keeping in mind for next year.
RELATED: An account of a drop from 374AW.
Colonel Mark Hering, the 374th Operations Group commander, participated in Operation Christmas Drop in December of 2009.
“I can say that in my 20 years of flying the C-130, it was one of the most moving missions, just hearing the voices on the other side of that radio and the excitement from all the islanders, hearing that a C-130 and a bundle from the sky were coming inbound.”
— Love, 2nd Lt. Christopher. “Operation Christmas Drop a team effort.” 374th Airlift Wing Public Affairs, 17 December 2010.
Admiral Mike Mullen (Chairman of the JCS) takes Senator John S. McCain out to the woodshed for a good and proper beating.
Also entertaining: McCain continues his transformation into Grandpa Simpson by claiming (erroneously) that SecDef Gates had never been in uniform (Gates was briefly a USAF 2nd Lieutenant). McCain also gives the opinions of the President and Secretary of Defense less weight than that of the service chiefs (with regard to DADT), because he regards neither Obama nor Gates as military leaders.
Despite the President’s serious domestic and foreign policy shortcomings, I am starting to think that America dodged a bullet by not electing McCain to the job.
We have all heard the Avro Arrow mythology promulgated for the public. That the Canadian division of UK-owned A.V. Roe and Company was contracted to provide a supersonic delta-winged interceptor; that an interceptor of unprecedented capabilities was built, and flight tests begun; but then the American military-industrial complex and unconscionable perfidy from the Prime Minister of the day (John Diefenbaker) conspired to kill the wonder jet so that money would be made, political ambitions furthered, et cetera. The power of the mythos is such that a 1997 made-for-television movie featuring Dan Akroyd was crafted with this storyline.
Problem is, the tragic fable is almost entirely false.
In the Spring 2010 edition of Airforce magazine, Colonel Layne Larsen, CD (Ret.) has penned a thorough takedown of the Arrow mythology. The colonel goes to no small pains to debunk the three main myths of the Arrow legend:
- That PM Diefenbaker’s short-sightedness or incompetence killed the Arrow program
- That Diefenbaker ordered the destruction of all program materials to prevent it from ever being resurrected.
- That the Arrow was so far ahead of its time, we would still be flying them today; also that we would not have bothered to buy four other fleets of foreign-designed aircraft (CF-101 Voodoo, CF-116 Freedom Fighter, CF-104 Starfighter, CF-188 Hornet).
[Point of clarification: There are two similarly named publications; Air Force magazine—often mentioned in this space—is the journal of the US Air Force Association, while Airforce magazine is the journal of the Air Force Association of Canada.]
I’ll try and summarise Colonel Larsen’s article here, but you’d be well-advised to pick up the magazine and read it, if you want the facts in greater detail.
Myth 1: Diefenbaker’s short-sightedness or incompetence killed the Arrow program
Although PM Diefenbaker made the official announcement on February 20th, 1959, the federal Cabinet made the decision, and it came after five months of deliberation—which was in fact initiated by a recommendation from the service chiefs of the Canadian military. The minutes of that August 1958 Cabinet meeting are available at DFAIT’s website, and they clearly indicate that the program costs had escalated to the point where “the Chiefs of Staff felt that, to meet the modest requirement of manned aircraft presently considered advisable, it would be more economical to procure a fully developed interceptor of comparable performance in the U.S.” In other words, the RCAF didn’t want the Arrow, and had already determined that its support and logistics costs outweighed its potential military value.
For what it’s worth, I have read elsewhere that the previous St. Laurent government had also decided it would kill the Arrow, had it been returned to office in the 1957 federal election.
Myth 2: Diefenbaker ordered the destruction of program materials to prevent it from being resurrected
Documents declassified in 1990 indicate that the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), Air Marshall Hugh Campbell, was the source of this direction. Normally the Department of Defence Production (DDP) had six months to dispose of program materials to other government departments, research centres, and scrap. A memo from G/C Ray Footit (signing for CAS) to DDP ordered that everything was to be cut up before being sold as scrap, and that no major components were to be sold as intact entities.
Myth 3: The Arrow was extremely advanced for its time, we’d still be flying them, and would not have bothered to buy other fighters.
The best way to answer this is to use Col. Larsen’s chart that accompanies the article. It compares performance data from several aircraft designs of the time.
The Arrow doesn’t lead the pack. It has good top speed and an acceptable service ceiling, but a thoroughly mediocre radius of action. Radius of action being the distance an aircraft can travel from its base and return, without refueling (this figure also includes a measly five minutes of combat engagement). The Arrow would have been the last to achieve IOC—whereas the very similar Convair F-106 had comparable speed, a slightly higher service ceiling, almost twice the radius of action, was available four years earlier, and was several times cheaper ($2 million per F-106 versus $8-10 million per CF-105.)
The F-106, incidentally, remained the backbone of USAF’s interceptor fleet until replaced by the F-15 Eagle.
As Col. Larsen makes clear, the Arrow died because of multiple factors. The RCAF had already accrued some bad experiences with the Avro-built CF-100, and they didn’t like the support they were getting from the company on that product. The RCAF’s senior brass very much doubted whether Avro could build an even more complex aircraft and still make it reliable and easy to maintain.
Unfortunately, Avro’s CF-105 prototypes were not built with ease of maintenance in mind; in one case it would take 70 hours to inspect a part whose inspection interval was only 50 hours. In other words, every two days’ flying time you had to ground the plane for three days in order to inspect the part. And that’s for a brand-new airplane, where most things should not be breaking too often. Imagine what would happen once that airframe had been in service for 10, 15 or 20 years. The Arrow would have been a ramp queen par excellence.
Worst of all, in just four years the Arrow’s program budget nearly doubled (going from $261 million to $400 million) while completing only five percent of the scheduled flight tests, and the radar/fire control system had yet to be installed, let alone tested. In 11 months the Arrow racked up only 80 hours of flight test time, while the F-106 managed to conduct 1,000 hours of flight testing in a year.
All our national myth-making aside, when you add up all the things that went wrong, the Arrow was a weapon system doomed from the start.
Thanks to Colonel Larsen for his bracing deconstruction of the Arrow mythos; if this is a subject that interests you, you ought to pick up the magazine and give it a read.
The E-3 Sentry has long been an critical asset for the US Air Force; each of the 32 active inventory aircraft can provide unparallelled air and surface situational awareness in a 250 nautical mile radius around the aircraft.
Now, manufacturer Boeing plans to test controlling a small UAV from an airborne Sentry in the annual (and presciently named) Empire Challenge exercise at USN’s Air Warfare Center Weapons Division China Lake.
AWACS as Remotely Piloted Aircraft Controller: Boeing plans to demonstrate control of the ScanEagle remotely piloted aircraft from an E-3 AWACS aircraft during the annual Empire Challenge coalition interoperability exercise that started Monday and runs through August 13 at Fort Huachuca, Ariz. “This will be the first time the company demonstrates full control of an unmanned aircraft by an airborne command and control platform during an operational scenario,” Boeing said in its release. A NATO AWACS will be equipped with a tactical common data link to relay commands to ScanEagle from an onboard operator. The scenario involves an antipiracy operation in which the AWACS detects suspicious activity and directs ScanEagle to a certain location to keep track of a suspect vessel—actually a truck acting as a surrogate pirate ship—while sending real-time video back to the AWACS to help determine whether the vessel is a threat.
— Daily Report, Air Force Association, 27 July 2010.
Seems like an interesting concept, although AWACS birds are already extremely high-value targets, being exactly the sort of expensive, low-density/high-demand asset that has to be spread thin in order to cover the C2BM (command and control battle management) requirements of US unified combatant commanders all around the globe.
Putting a bunch of UCAV pilots aboard—especially once UCAVs evolve into ACM-capable fighters in their own right—will make it just that much more important for the OPFOR to destroy these assets as quickly as they can.
IRONY ALERT: From the same AFA Daily Report piece, we learn that the Pentagon is looking to eliminate Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). For those not in the know, JFCOM is the sponsoring agency for the Empire Challenge coalition interoperability exercise.
JFCOM in Crosshairs of Pentagon Advisory Board: The Defense Business Board has identified the elimination of US Joint Forces Command as one way of trimming the Defense Department’s excess overhead. This move is among the initial observations from the senior advisory panel’s look into how the Pentagon could shed more than $100 billion in nonessential overhead between Fiscal 2012-16 to free up funds for modernization and personnel. Defense Secretary Robert Gates asked for the board’s input. According to press reports, board members think Norfolk, Va.-based JFCOM is ripe for the ax since it is bloated with more contractors on its payroll than military and civilian personnel, and some of its organizations apparently have the same mission and even similar names. The panel is scheduled to submit its final recommendations to Gates in October. Already Virginia lawmakers, including Gov. Bob McDonnell (R), are circling the wagons to save the command. (See The Hill report and Virginian-Pilot report.) (McDonnell statement) (Cantor statement) (Scott statement)
Adam Hebert, executive editor of the Air Force Association’s house magazine, wrote an interesting piece in the July issue about the history of MIRVed ICBMs. He notes that the landmark SALT treaties had the opposite of their intended effect because they restricted only the number of launchers, not warheads—drastically increasing the desire for each side to MIRV their treaty-limited number of launch platforms.
Arms negotiator Paul C. Warnke memorably, and mistakenly, compared the superpowers to “apes on a treadmill,” with both “jogging in tandem on a treadmill to nowhere.” There was only one ape, though. Former Defense Secretary Harold Brown had it right when he said, “When we build, they build; when we stop building, they build.”
According to Natural Resources Defense Council estimates, the US and Soviet Union in 1975 each had roughly 2,200 warheads atop their ICBMs.
Over the next five years, the US total didn’t change, but Moscow more than doubled its MIRV force, winding up with 5,630 warheads fitted to its 1,400 or so land-based missiles. A huge number of these—more than 3,000 warheads—were found on the monster, 10-warhead SS-18 missiles. The Soviets had 308 of them.
— Hebert, Adam. “Issue Brief: The Rise and Semi-Fall of MIRV.” Air Force magazine, July 2010. [Emphasis mine]
Although we enjoy considerably less tension in relations between the great powers today, the old dynamic is still at work. While the United States has agreed to de-MIRV its entire Minuteman III inventory (and currently has about 550 warheads aboard 450 launchers), Russia maintains an inventory of 1,100 warheads aboard its 331 ICBMs.
The last two or three of the images have a certain desolate quality that make it all too easy to imagine the real thing.
Never been to Incirlik, but something about these images summons up memories of the late 80s/early 90s, and the way one’s helmet band and the old ’82 pattern webbing started to get that “old web gear” smell in the summer humidity. I miss it, in a way; to my middle-aged self it seems like the smell of youth.
Here’s the original US Air Force photo essay.