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Airlift: a distraction?

As an aviation-related blog, naturally the Company focuses its attention on the aerial aspects of the relief effort in Haiti.  But airlift has some inherent limitations, chief among them being that even the very largest aircraft have tiny payload capacities when compared to ships.  In typical logistics doctrine, airlift happens first because it can reach an affected area in hours, whereas sealift takes days (or sometimes weeks).  But as the conflict or crisis drags on, airlift’s priority wanes once sealift is established.  Writing at the US Naval Institute blog, author Galrahn (who also writes at Information Dissemination) is anxious to see sealift get the attention it deserves.  While I don’t necessarily agree with his characterisation of USAF’s effort, it’s an interesting read.  And it is inarguable that sealift’s throughput and cost effectiveness is an order of magnitude greater than airlift; airlift’s primary advantages have always been speed and flexibility, not volume.

Todd H. Guggisberg, Assistant Professor, Department of Logistics and Resource Operations (DLRO) US Army Command and General Staff College emailed me today with an important observation.

As a retired career Army logistics officer, I am following the events closely.  Understanding what it means to feed/water/shelter 3 million people is difficult for most Americans.  One of my logistics students did a quick estimate and came up with a requirement for 2,000 cargo trucks per day to supply ONE humanitarian ration to 3 million people per day….and rations are easy compared to water.

That might explain why there has been a policy change regarding the danger of airdropping relief supplies. Are things getting critical? Probably more than most Americans probably realize.

One C-17 airdrop represents ~30,000 rations (usually divided between humanitarian rations and bottled water), and we would need to conduct more than 100 C-17 airdrops per day and equally distribute those rations just to get just 1 bottle of water or 1 humanitarian ration to each of the 3 million people the UN says are in need in Haiti today. The SOUTHCOM focus to date on the one runway airfield is a distraction, by no fuzzy math is it possible for ~180 planes around the world to meet the demand of the Haiti catastrophe

– galrahn.  “Obama’s Public Diplomacy From Haiti Wears Combat Boots.”  US Naval Institute blog, 19 January 2010.

I am sure the US Navy (and allied navies) are working hard at opening up critical port facilities; but this bound to be somewhat camera-unsexy.  It involves a lot of planning, surveying, diving and so forth, things the land-based media can’t film easily.  It takes far less effort for a camera operator to sit at an airfield and get shots of aircraft taxiing around, while a reporter makes concerned noises.  They will continue to film the airport because that is what they know, and because more of their audience back home have flown aboard commercial aircraft into an airport (and can relate to that).  Very few audience members will have known the experience of sailing into a major seaport aboard a ro/ro bulk carrier, and helping to unload it.

Combine this with the media’s usual lack of knowledge/interest in military matters, and odds are most reporters on the ground don’t know that the next few hours in the seaports are where the battle for Haitian lives will be won or lost.

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Pearl Harbor

A selection of images from Flickr, to remember the day.

2. Pearl Harbor, originally uploaded by spaz_writer999.

Pearl Harbor 141, originally uploaded by savage_man_2003.
Pearl Harbor 138, originally uploaded by savage_man_2003.
Pearl Harbor 135, originally uploaded by savage_man_2003.
Pearl Harbor 120, originally uploaded by savage_man_2003.

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Category: Historica  Tags: , ,  Comments off

USS Arizona, before and after the attack on Pearl Harbour

Part I:

Part II:

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Doolittle Raiders on Flickr

Flickr user Doug Sheley has done yeoman work by compiling a visual record of all sixteen Doolittle Raid aircrews; naming the personnel, their assigned target, and any combat deaths (on this operation or subsequent missions).  For details specific to each image, click on the image, you will be redirected to the Flickr page for it.

Photo #: NH 53296, originally uploaded by Doug Sheley.

See the whole Flickr set for more.

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The Air Force Story (1949): The Doolittle Raid

An excerpt from one of the twenty half-hour movies that comprise The Air Force Story; a series of films commissioned by General of the Army Henry “Hap” Arnold in 1944, and narrated by Arthur Godfrey, a famous radio personality, pilot and aviation booster of the 1940s and 50s.

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American Jewish Women in the Second World War

A collection of images from the Jewish Women’s Archive and the Jewish Historical Society of Greater Hartford.

Muriel Christmas Day, 1944, originally uploaded by JWA Commons.

See the JWA’s Flickr photostream for more.

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HMS Victory, 64-gun broadside

You don’t get to see this very often:

(Hat tip to Mike Burleson of New Wars.)

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It’s morning in America, all right

LockMart’s ex-CEO says NASA doesn’t have enough juice to make a go of the Constellation program.  Who needs manned spaceflight, anyway?

And USN brass start making nervous sounds about the Navy’s tactical flexibility, in what one presumes is a pre-emptive shot at preserving a slice of the shrinking DoD pie (via Neptunus Lex).

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New European missile defence

USS Shiloh (CG 67) launching a Standard SM-3 missile.  The SM-3 intercepted a separating ballistic missile threat target, launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii.  (June 22, 2006 | US Navy photo)

USS Shiloh (CG 67) launching a Standard SM-3 missile. The SM-3 intercepted a separating ballistic missile target, launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sands, Kauai. (June 22, 2006 | US Navy photo)

For what it’s worth, I agree with SECDEF Gates’ rebuttal via the New York Times; deploying sea-based SM-3 interceptors can happen faster than the previously-planned ground-based interceptor, and the SM-3 has a better track record than any other BMD system being tested and fielded today.  Even the future plan to have ground-based SM-3s has a certain merit.

But there are some large caveats and potential issues.  First and foremost is the capabilities of the United States Navy, specifically the guided missile cruiser (CG) and destroyer (DDG) platforms that will be the mainstay of this plan.

There are 22 active Ticonderoga-class CGs, and 55 active Arleigh Burke-class DDGs in the USN inventory, all of whom carry the enormously capable Aegis Combat System.  Right now USN has upgraded 3 cruisers and 15 destroyers to BMD capability, with three more still on the books; that’s 21 total Aegis BMD platforms to patrol the world’s seas.

Obviously all 21 ships are not out at sea at any given moment; in a standard USN single-crew rotation, a surface warship will spend 12 to 18 months training and performing maintenance on their vessel to prepare it for deployment.  Then the crew takes their ship on a 6-month deployment, at the end of which they return to home port and the cycle begins anew.  The actual amount of time it takes a ship to begin and end that cycle also depends on how far away its patrol station is, whether it is leaving from the East or West Coast, and how many intermediate stops it makes.  Generally speaking it takes somewhere between three and six weeks to arrive on station.

With those limitations in mind, USN thus requires a force of six surface combatants to keep a single vessel on-station at all times in Central Command’s AOR—or a rotation ratio of 6 to 1. For European Command or Pacific Command, the ratio is 4.5 to 1.  If you factor these in to the current Aegis BMD fleet size, you will realise that only four Aegis BMD ships will be on-station at any given time—one or two in European and Central Commands, and two in Pacific Command.  The others will be back at home port working up for the next deployment, or steaming to and from their assigned station.  And that’s it; you’ve maxed out the deployment capabilities of your Aegis BMD fleet.

Now USN has experimented with Blue/Gold dual crews (such as those used on its SSBNs and SSGNs), and is planning to use multi-crew rotations for its Littoral Combat Ships, thus increasing the amount of time they spend at sea.  (For an in-depth analysis of USN multi-crew rotations, see the Congressional Budget Office document “Crew Rotation in the Navy: The Long-Term Effect on Forward Presence“, October 2007.)   Such a solution could be implemented on Aegis BMD ships (if not the entire surface combatant fleet at large) to help offset the limited number of vessels.  But even this is not going to give you the sort of constant all-aspect coverage US and allied policymakers—and their publics!—will want from a BMD system.  To have a really effective deterrent, you need to increase the number of BMD-capable vessels.

If we are (as the SecDef has previously indicated) living in an era of flat, constrained defence budgets, then either BMD is going to remain a niche capability confined to one quarter of the CG/DDG fleet, or the Administration is going to have to find creative ways of funding BMD upgrades for more ships.

One other concern, too, is that all of Europe’s missile defence eggs will be riding on a single weapon system.  Should opposing forces come up with a cheap and effective way of jamming or defeating the redoubtable Standard SM-3 (besides sheer volume of missiles), then they will have defeated the totality of this administration’s planned European BMD deployment.  There is a certain value in having multiple capabilities on multiple platforms, but for now Europe will have to hope the SM-3 will remain as effective as it appears to be today.

The other downer is countering a CG/DDG.  To degrade the effectiveness of a land-based facility you can either 1) degrade or destroy the radar, 2) degrade or destroy the interceptors or 3) oversaturate the BMD system with more targets than it can intercept.  None of these methods are particularly cheap.  But to degrade the effectiveness of Aegis BMD you really only need one thing: a quiet diesel-electric sub.  Those aren’t too hard to come by.

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Successful underwater launch of AIM-9X Sidewinder air-air missile

Now those SSGN boats operating close inshore (deploying SEALs and whatnot) will have something to shoot back at airborne threats.

It’s about time subs received some fangs to bare at ASW helos and maritime patrol aircraft.

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